hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks
Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.
Best use case
hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.
Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.
Teams using hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.
When to use this skill
- You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.
When not to use this skill
- You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
- You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks Compares
| Feature / Agent | hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | Not specified | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
Related Guides
AI Agents for Coding
Browse AI agent skills for coding, debugging, testing, refactoring, code review, and developer workflows across Claude, Cursor, and Codex.
AI Agents for Marketing
Discover AI agents for marketing workflows, from SEO and content production to campaign research, outreach, and analytics.
AI Agents for Startups
Explore AI agent skills for startup validation, product research, growth experiments, documentation, and fast execution with small teams.
SKILL.md Source
# Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks ## Overview NTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts. ## When to Use - When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks - When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain - When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type - When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques ## Prerequisites - Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs - Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145) - Network access for SMB signing status checks ## Key Detection Areas 1. **IP-hostname mismatch** — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress 2. **NTLMSSP authentication** — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts 3. **Machine account relay** — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs 4. **Rapid authentication** — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds 5. **Named pipe access** — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes 6. **SMB signing disabled** — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks ## Output JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.
Related Skills
performing-threat-hunting-with-yara-rules
Use YARA pattern-matching rules to hunt for malware, suspicious files, and indicators of compromise across filesystems and memory dumps. Covers rule authoring, yara-python scanning, and integration with threat intel feeds.
performing-threat-hunting-with-elastic-siem
Performs proactive threat hunting in Elastic Security SIEM using KQL/EQL queries, detection rules, and Timeline investigation to identify threats that evade automated detection. Use when SOC teams need to hunt for specific ATT&CK techniques, investigate anomalous behaviors, or validate detection coverage gaps using Elasticsearch and Kibana Security.
hunting-for-webshell-activity
Hunt for web shell deployments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.
hunting-for-unusual-service-installations
Detect suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event logs for Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and identifying indicators of persistence mechanisms.
hunting-for-unusual-network-connections
Hunt for unusual network connections by analyzing outbound traffic patterns, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and anomalous connection frequencies from endpoints.
hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation
Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.
hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks
Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns that indicate T1053.005 abuse.
hunting-for-supply-chain-compromise
Hunt for supply chain compromise indicators including trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts.
hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence
Detect T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, analyzing autoruns entries, and using Python watchdog for real-time filesystem monitoring.
hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators
Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.
hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion
Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.
hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence
Hunt for adversary persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns.