multiAI Summary Pending
onchain-contract-token-analysis
Analyze smart contracts, token mechanics, permissions, fee flows, upgradeability, market risks, and likely attack surfaces for onchain projects. Use when reviewing ERC-20s, launchpads, vaults, staking systems, LP fee routing, ownership controls, proxy setups, or suspicious token behavior.
3,556 stars
byopenclaw
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
$curl -o ~/.claude/skills/onchain-contract-tokens/SKILL.md --create-dirs "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openclaw/skills/main/skills/0xrowan/onchain-contract-tokens/SKILL.md"
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/onchain-contract-tokens/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How onchain-contract-token-analysis Compares
| Feature / Agent | onchain-contract-token-analysis | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | multi | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Analyze smart contracts, token mechanics, permissions, fee flows, upgradeability, market risks, and likely attack surfaces for onchain projects. Use when reviewing ERC-20s, launchpads, vaults, staking systems, LP fee routing, ownership controls, proxy setups, or suspicious token behavior.
Which AI agents support this skill?
This skill is compatible with multi.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
SKILL.md Source
# Onchain Contract / Token Analysis Use this skill when the task is to assess a token, protocol, launch module, vault, staking system, router, or related onchain project from a security, permissions, tokenomics, or behavior perspective. ## Core objective Produce a practical analysis that answers: - What the system does - Who controls it - How value and fees move - What privileged actions exist - What users can lose money from - Whether there are obvious red flags or design risks ## Workflow ### 1. Identify the scope First determine which of these the request actually targets: - token contract - factory / launcher - vault / staking / locker - router / hook / proxy / module - admin / governance / registry - full protocol system If the scope is unclear, infer it from the files, addresses, ABI names, deployment scripts, or docs. ### 2. Map the architecture Before judging risk, build a compact model of the system: - main contracts - ownership / admin roles - external dependencies - upgradeability pattern - event flow - token creation flow - fee routing flow Prefer a short system map over long prose. ### 3. Check control and permissions Always verify: - `owner`, `admin`, `governor`, `operator`, `manager`, `signer` - role-based access control - pausable / blacklist / whitelist powers - mint / burn / seize / rescue / withdraw permissions - parameter setters - upgrade authority - emergency functions Call out who can do what, and whether those powers are bounded or dangerous. ### 4. Check token mechanics For ERC-20 and tokenized systems, verify: - total supply model - mintability - burnability - transfer restrictions - fee on transfer / tax - max wallet / max tx rules - trading enable switch - blacklist / antibot logic - rebasing / reflection / hidden balance logic - allowance edge cases If the token claims to be standard, confirm whether behavior actually matches that claim. ### 5. Check fee and value flow Trace where user funds or protocol fees go: - LP fee recipients - treasury recipients - locker / vault recipients - protocol fee splits - conversion / swap path - withdrawal path - claim path Do not just name recipients. Explain whether they are: - immutable - admin-changeable - delayed - claim-based - dependent on offchain identity or signatures ### 6. Check upgradeability and mutability If proxies or modules exist, verify: - proxy type - implementation admin - initialization safety - reinitialization protection - storage layout assumptions - upgrade trust model If not upgradeable, still check whether behavior can change through configurable modules. ### 7. Check attack surface Look for: - arbitrary external calls - reentrancy opportunities - unchecked token callbacks - unsafe approvals - signature replay - missing nonce / deadline checks - address(0) edge cases - misconfigured recipient logic - accounting mismatch - stale state after recipient updates - rounding leakage - griefing / denial-of-service vectors When risk depends on business assumptions, state that explicitly. ### 8. Check market-facing risk When the target is a token or launch flow, explicitly assess: - honeypot-like behavior - sell restrictions - hidden tax changes - admin ability to freeze exits - liquidity custody - locker guarantees - whether front-end labels could misclassify the asset Do not overclaim. Distinguish: - confirmed malicious logic - dangerous centralization - poor design - heuristic / market-behavior false positives ## Output format Default to this structure: ### Summary One short paragraph stating what the system is and the top conclusion. ### Findings List issues in severity order: - severity - title - affected contract / function - why it matters - exploit or failure mode - whether it is confirmed or conditional ### Trust model State: - who controls upgrades - who controls fees - who controls pauses or restrictions - what users must trust offchain ### Token / fee flow Explain: - how tokens are created - where fees accrue - who can claim them - what can change later ### Open questions List anything blocked by missing source, missing ABI, missing deployment info, or offchain dependencies. ## Special guidance ### When reviewing a suspicious token Be precise: - "can blacklist holders" is stronger than "looks risky" - "owner can change tax" is stronger than "may be a scam" - "no onchain sell restriction found" is stronger than "not a honeypot" ### When reviewing a launch module Always distinguish: - launcher logic - underlying token implementation - LP locker behavior - fee locker behavior - who receives economic rights ### When chain data is required If the task depends on live state, verify with current chain or explorer data instead of assuming from source alone. ## Do not - Do not call something malicious without code-based support - Do not confuse admin centralization with exploitability - Do not ignore offchain identity dependencies when they control payouts - Do not stop at contract syntax; trace actual economic outcomes