collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host
Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised system following order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, processes, and system state before they are lost.
Best use case
collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.
Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised system following order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, processes, and system state before they are lost.
Teams using collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.
When to use this skill
- You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.
When not to use this skill
- You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
- You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host Compares
| Feature / Agent | collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | Not specified | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised system following order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, processes, and system state before they are lost.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
SKILL.md Source
# Collecting Volatile Evidence from Compromised Hosts ## When to Use - Security incident confirmed and compromised host identified - Before system isolation, shutdown, or remediation begins - Memory-resident malware suspected (fileless attacks) - Need to capture network connections, running processes, and system state - Legal proceedings may require forensic evidence preservation - Incident requires root cause analysis with volatile data ## Prerequisites - Forensic collection toolkit on USB or network share (trusted tools) - WinPmem/LiME for memory acquisition - Write-blocker or forensic workstation for disk imaging - Chain of custody documentation forms - Secure evidence storage with integrity verification - Authorization to collect evidence (legal/HR approval for insider cases) ## Workflow ### Step 1: Prepare Collection Environment ```bash # Mount forensic USB toolkit (do NOT install tools on compromised system) # Verify toolkit integrity sha256sum /mnt/forensic_usb/tools/* > /tmp/toolkit_hashes.txt diff /mnt/forensic_usb/tools/known_good_hashes.txt /tmp/toolkit_hashes.txt # Create evidence output directory with timestamps EVIDENCE_DIR="/mnt/evidence/$(hostname)_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)" mkdir -p "$EVIDENCE_DIR" echo "Collection started: $(date -u)" > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt" echo "Collector: $(whoami)" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt" echo "System: $(hostname)" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt" ``` ### Step 2: Capture System Memory (Highest Volatility) ```bash # Windows - WinPmem memory acquisition winpmem_mini_x64.exe "$EVIDENCE_DIR\memdump_$(hostname).raw" # Linux - LiME kernel module for memory acquisition insmod /mnt/forensic_usb/lime.ko "path=$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_$(hostname).lime format=lime" # Linux - Alternative using /proc/kcore dd if=/proc/kcore of="$EVIDENCE_DIR/kcore_dump.raw" bs=1M # macOS - osxpmem osxpmem -o "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_$(hostname).aff4" # Hash the memory dump immediately sha256sum "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_"* > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memory_hash.sha256" ``` ### Step 3: Capture Network State ```bash # Active network connections # Windows netstat -anob > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/netstat_connections.txt" 2>&1 Get-NetTCPConnection | Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/tcp_connections.csv" -NoTypeInformation Get-NetUDPEndpoint | Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/udp_endpoints.csv" -NoTypeInformation # Linux ss -tulnp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/socket_stats.txt" netstat -anp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/netstat_all.txt" 2>/dev/null cat /proc/net/tcp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_net_tcp.txt" cat /proc/net/udp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_net_udp.txt" # ARP cache arp -a > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/arp_cache.txt" # Routing table route print > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/routing_table.txt" # Windows ip route show > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/routing_table.txt" # Linux # DNS cache ipconfig /displaydns > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/dns_cache.txt" # Windows # Linux: varies by resolver, check systemd-resolve or nscd systemd-resolve --statistics > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/dns_stats.txt" 2>/dev/null # Active firewall rules netsh advfirewall show allprofiles > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/firewall_rules.txt" # Windows iptables -L -n -v > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/iptables_rules.txt" # Linux ``` ### Step 4: Capture Running Processes ```bash # Windows - Detailed process list tasklist /V /FO CSV > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_list_verbose.csv" wmic process list full > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/wmic_process_full.txt" Get-Process | Select-Object Id,ProcessName,Path,StartTime,CPU,WorkingSet | Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ps_processes.csv" -NoTypeInformation # Windows - Process with command line and parent wmic process get ProcessId,Name,CommandLine,ParentProcessId,ExecutablePath /FORMAT:CSV > \ "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_commandlines.csv" # Linux - Full process tree ps auxwwf > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_tree.txt" ps -eo pid,ppid,user,args --forest > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_forest.txt" cat /proc/*/cmdline 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' ' > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_cmdline_all.txt" # Process modules/DLLs loaded # Windows listdlls.exe -accepteula > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/loaded_dlls.txt" # Linux for pid in $(ls /proc/ | grep -E '^[0-9]+$'); do echo "=== PID $pid ===" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_maps.txt" cat "/proc/$pid/maps" 2>/dev/null >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_maps.txt" done # Open file handles handle.exe -accepteula > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/open_handles.txt" # Windows (Sysinternals) lsof > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/open_files.txt" # Linux ``` ### Step 5: Capture Logged-in Users and Sessions ```bash # Windows query user > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/logged_in_users.txt" query session > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/active_sessions.txt" net session > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/net_sessions.txt" 2>&1 net use > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/mapped_drives.txt" 2>&1 # Linux who > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/who_output.txt" w > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/w_output.txt" last -50 > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/last_logins.txt" lastlog > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/lastlog.txt" cat /var/log/auth.log | tail -200 > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/recent_auth.txt" 2>/dev/null ``` ### Step 6: Capture System Configuration State ```bash # System time (critical for timeline) date -u > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/system_time_utc.txt" w32tm /query /status > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ntp_status.txt" # Windows ntpq -p > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ntp_status.txt" # Linux # Environment variables set > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/environment_vars.txt" # Windows env > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/environment_vars.txt" # Linux # Scheduled tasks / Cron jobs schtasks /query /fo CSV /v > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/scheduled_tasks.csv" # Windows crontab -l > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/crontab_current.txt" 2>/dev/null # Linux ls -la /etc/cron.* > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/cron_dirs.txt" 2>/dev/null # Services sc queryex type=service state=all > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/services_all.txt" # Windows systemctl list-units --type=service --all > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/systemd_services.txt" # Linux # Windows Registry - key autostart locations reg export "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_run_hklm.reg" /y reg export "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_run_hkcu.reg" /y reg export "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_services.reg" /y ``` ### Step 7: Hash All Evidence and Document Chain of Custody ```bash # Generate SHA256 hashes for all collected evidence cd "$EVIDENCE_DIR" sha256sum * > evidence_manifest.sha256 # Create chain of custody record cat > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/chain_of_custody.txt" << EOF CHAIN OF CUSTODY RECORD ======================== Case ID: IR-YYYY-NNN Collection Date: $(date -u) Collected By: $(whoami) System: $(hostname) System IP: $(hostname -I 2>/dev/null || ipconfig | grep IPv4) Collection Method: Live forensic collection via trusted USB toolkit Evidence Items: $(ls -la "$EVIDENCE_DIR/" | grep -v chain_of_custody) SHA256 Manifest: evidence_manifest.sha256 Transfer: [TO BE COMPLETED] Storage Location: [TO BE COMPLETED] EOF ``` ## Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Order of Volatility | RFC 3227 - Collect most volatile data first: registers > cache > memory > disk | | Live Forensics | Collecting evidence from a running system before shutdown | | Chain of Custody | Documentation tracking evidence handling from collection to court | | Forensic Soundness | Ensuring evidence collection doesn't alter the original evidence | | Trusted Tools | Using verified tools from external media, not from the compromised system | | Evidence Integrity | SHA256 hashing of all evidence immediately after collection | | Locard's Exchange Principle | Every contact leaves a trace - minimize investigator artifacts | ## Tools & Systems | Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | WinPmem | Windows memory acquisition | | LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) | Linux kernel memory acquisition | | Sysinternals Suite | Process, handle, and DLL analysis (Windows) | | Velociraptor | Remote forensic collection at scale | | KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser) | Automated artifact collection on Windows | | CyLR | Cross-platform live response collection | | GRR Rapid Response | Remote live forensics framework | ## Common Scenarios 1. **Fileless Malware Attack**: PowerShell-based attack with no files on disk. Memory dump is critical evidence containing the malicious scripts. 2. **Active C2 Session**: Attacker has live connection. Network connections and process data reveal C2 infrastructure. 3. **Insider Data Theft**: Employee copying files. Process list, mapped drives, and network connections show exfiltration activity. 4. **Compromised Web Server**: Web shell detected. Memory may contain additional backdoors not yet written to disk. 5. **Lateral Movement in Progress**: Attacker moving between systems. Authentication tokens and network sessions in memory reveal scope. ## Output Format - Memory dump file (.raw or .lime format) with SHA256 hash - Network state captures (connections, ARP, DNS, routes) - Process listings with command lines and parent processes - User session and authentication data - System configuration snapshots - Evidence manifest with SHA256 checksums - Chain of custody documentation
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