hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi
Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.
Best use case
hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.
Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.
Teams using hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.
When to use this skill
- You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.
When not to use this skill
- You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
- You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi Compares
| Feature / Agent | hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | Not specified | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
SKILL.md Source
# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI ## Overview Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity/Operational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence. ## When to Use - When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi - When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain - When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type - When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques ## Prerequisites - Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line) - Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured - Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries - Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior ## Steps ### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events Extract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files. ### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes Flag processes where ParentImage/ParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution. ### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns Identify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe /q /c, output redirection to admin$ share). ### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions Parse WMI-Activity/Operational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence. ## Expected Output JSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.
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