hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

16 stars

Best use case

hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

Teams using hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.

When to use this skill

  • You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.

When not to use this skill

  • You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
  • You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.

Installation

Claude Code / Cursor / Codex

$curl -o ~/.claude/skills/hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence/SKILL.md --create-dirs "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/plurigrid/asi/main/plugins/asi/skills/hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence/SKILL.md"

Manual Installation

  1. Download SKILL.md from GitHub
  2. Place it in .claude/skills/hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence/SKILL.md inside your project
  3. Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill

How hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence Compares

Feature / Agenthunting-for-registry-run-key-persistenceStandard Approach
Platform SupportNot specifiedLimited / Varies
Context Awareness High Baseline
Installation ComplexityUnknownN/A

Frequently Asked Questions

What does this skill do?

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

Where can I find the source code?

You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.

SKILL.md Source

# Hunting for Registry Run Key Persistence

## Overview

Registry Run keys (T1547.001) are one of the most commonly used persistence mechanisms by adversaries. When a program is added to a Run key in the Windows registry, it executes automatically when a user logs in. Attackers abuse keys under `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`, `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`, and their RunOnce counterparts to maintain persistence. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent - Value Set) captures registry value modifications including the target object path, the process that made the change, and the new value. Detection involves monitoring these events for suspicious executables in temp directories, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBin paths, and processes that do not normally create Run key entries. Chaining Event 13 with Event 1 (Process Creation) and Event 11 (FileCreate) strengthens detection by confirming payload creation and execution.


## When to Use

- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for registry run key persistence
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

## Prerequisites

- Windows systems with Sysmon installed and configured to log Event ID 13
- Sysmon config with RegistryEvent rules for Run/RunOnce keys
- Python 3.9+ with `json`, `xml.etree.ElementTree`, `re` modules
- SIEM or log aggregator collecting Sysmon logs (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Knowledge of legitimate auto-start programs for baseline comparison

## Steps

1. Collect Sysmon Event ID 13 logs filtered for Run/RunOnce key paths
2. Parse event XML/JSON for TargetObject, Details (value written), Image (modifying process)
3. Flag entries where the value points to temp directories, AppData, or ProgramData
4. Detect encoded PowerShell commands or script interpreters in registry values
5. Identify LOLBin abuse (mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, wscript.exe)
6. Compare against known-good baseline of legitimate auto-start entries
7. Check if the modifying process (Image) is unusual (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe)
8. Chain with Event ID 1 to verify if the registered binary was recently created
9. Generate detection report with MITRE ATT&CK mapping and severity scores
10. Produce Sigma/Splunk detection rules from findings

## Expected Output

A JSON report listing suspicious Run key entries with the registry path, value written, modifying process, timestamp, MITRE technique mapping, severity rating, and recommended Sigma detection rules.

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