implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign
Sign and verify container image provenance using Sigstore Cosign with keyless OIDC-based signing, attestations, and Kubernetes admission enforcement.
Best use case
implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign is best used when you need a repeatable AI agent workflow instead of a one-off prompt.
Sign and verify container image provenance using Sigstore Cosign with keyless OIDC-based signing, attestations, and Kubernetes admission enforcement.
Teams using implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign should expect a more consistent output, faster repeated execution, less prompt rewriting.
When to use this skill
- You want a reusable workflow that can be run more than once with consistent structure.
When not to use this skill
- You only need a quick one-off answer and do not need a reusable workflow.
- You cannot install or maintain the underlying files, dependencies, or repository context.
Installation
Claude Code / Cursor / Codex
Manual Installation
- Download SKILL.md from GitHub
- Place it in
.claude/skills/implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign/SKILL.mdinside your project - Restart your AI agent — it will auto-discover the skill
How implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign Compares
| Feature / Agent | implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign | Standard Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Platform Support | Not specified | Limited / Varies |
| Context Awareness | High | Baseline |
| Installation Complexity | Unknown | N/A |
Frequently Asked Questions
What does this skill do?
Sign and verify container image provenance using Sigstore Cosign with keyless OIDC-based signing, attestations, and Kubernetes admission enforcement.
Where can I find the source code?
You can find the source code on GitHub using the link provided at the top of the page.
SKILL.md Source
# Implementing Image Provenance Verification with Cosign
## Overview
Cosign is a Sigstore tool for signing, verifying, and attaching metadata to container images and OCI artifacts. It supports both key-based and keyless (OIDC) signing, integrates with Fulcio (certificate authority) and Rekor (transparency log), and enables supply chain security for container images.
## When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing image provenance verification with cosign capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
## Prerequisites
- Cosign CLI installed
- Docker or Podman for building images
- OCI-compliant container registry (Docker Hub, GHCR, GCR, ECR)
- OIDC provider account (GitHub, Google, Microsoft) for keyless signing
## Installing Cosign
```bash
# Install via Go
go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest
# Install via Homebrew
brew install cosign
# Install via script
curl -O -L "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/latest/download/cosign-linux-amd64"
sudo mv cosign-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/cosign
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign
# Verify installation
cosign version
```
## Key-Based Signing
### Generate Key Pair
```bash
# Generate cosign key pair (creates cosign.key and cosign.pub)
cosign generate-key-pair
# Generate key pair stored in KMS
cosign generate-key-pair --kms awskms:///alias/cosign-key
cosign generate-key-pair --kms gcpkms://projects/PROJECT/locations/LOCATION/keyRings/KEYRING/cryptoKeys/KEY
cosign generate-key-pair --kms hashivault://transit/keys/cosign
```
### Sign Image with Key
```bash
# Sign an image
cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Sign with annotations
cosign sign --key cosign.key \
-a "build-id=12345" \
-a "git-sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
```
### Verify Image with Key
```bash
# Verify signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify with annotation check
cosign verify --key cosign.pub \
-a "build-id=12345" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
```
## Keyless Signing (OIDC)
### Sign with Keyless (Interactive)
```bash
# Keyless sign - opens browser for OIDC auth
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# The signature, certificate, and Rekor entry are created automatically
```
### Sign with Keyless (CI/CD - Non-Interactive)
```bash
# GitHub Actions (uses OIDC token automatically)
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--yes
# With explicit identity token
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--identity-token=$(cat /var/run/sigstore/cosign/oidc-token) \
--yes
```
### Verify Keyless Signature
```bash
# Verify by email identity
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=builder@example.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
# Verify by GitHub Actions workflow
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/heads/main \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
# Verify with regex matching
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity-regexp=".*@example.com" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
```
## Attestations (SLSA Provenance)
### Attach SBOM Attestation
```bash
# Generate SBOM
syft ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.cdx.json
# Attach SBOM as attestation
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type cyclonedx \
--predicate sbom.cdx.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify attestation
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub \
--type cyclonedx \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
```
### Attach Vulnerability Scan Attestation
```bash
# Run scan and save results
grype ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 -o json > vuln-scan.json
# Attach scan results as attestation
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type vuln \
--predicate vuln-scan.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
```
### SLSA Provenance Attestation
```bash
# Attach SLSA provenance
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type slsaprovenance \
--predicate provenance.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify SLSA provenance
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub \
--type slsaprovenance \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
```
## CI/CD Integration
### GitHub Actions
```yaml
name: Sign and Publish
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write # Required for keyless signing
jobs:
build-sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Login to GHCR
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push
id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
with:
push: true
tags: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }}
- name: Sign image (keyless)
run: |
cosign sign --yes \
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
- name: Generate and attach SBOM
run: |
syft ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json
cosign attest --yes \
--type cyclonedx \
--predicate sbom.json \
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
```
## Kubernetes Admission Enforcement
### Policy Controller (Sigstore)
```bash
# Install policy-controller
helm repo add sigstore https://sigstore.github.io/helm-charts
helm install policy-controller sigstore/policy-controller \
--namespace cosign-system --create-namespace
```
```yaml
# Enforce signed images in namespace
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: require-signed-images
spec:
images:
- glob: "ghcr.io/myorg/**"
authorities:
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.sigstore.dev
identities:
- issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
subjectRegExp: "https://github.com/myorg/.*"
ctlog:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
```
### Kyverno Integration
```yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: verify-image-signature
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
rules:
- name: verify-cosign-signature
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "ghcr.io/myorg/*"
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/myorg/*"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
rekor:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
```
## Transparency Log (Rekor)
```bash
# Search Rekor for image signatures
rekor-cli search --email builder@example.com
# Get specific entry
rekor-cli get --uuid <entry-uuid>
# Verify entry inclusion
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=builder@example.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
```
## Best Practices
1. **Use keyless signing** in CI/CD for automated pipelines
2. **Sign by digest** not by tag for immutable references
3. **Attach SBOM attestations** alongside signatures
4. **Enforce signatures** at admission with policy-controller or Kyverno
5. **Use OIDC identity** verification instead of just key verification
6. **Store keys in KMS** (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault) for key-based signing
7. **Verify the full chain**: signature + certificate + Rekor inclusion
8. **Include build metadata** as annotations on signaturesRelated Skills
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