Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.

Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry

Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.

Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.

Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.

Hunt for adversary abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by analyzing endpoint process creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes.

Proactively hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to execute malicious payloads while evading detection.

Hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, data staging, and exfiltration including abuse of Azure, AWS, GCP services, and SaaS platforms.

Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.

Detect domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI vs HTTP Host header mismatches in proxy logs and TLS certificate discrepancies using pyOpenSSL for certificate inspection

Detect DNS tunneling and data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types indicating covert channel communication.

Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails API, and DNS audit log analysis.

Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.

Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects through Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 3 (network connection) correlation, WMI event analysis, RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135, and DCOM-specific parent-child process relationships.

Detect data staging activity before exfiltration by monitoring for archive creation with 7-Zip/RAR, unusual temp folder access, large file consolidation, and staging directory patterns via EDR and process telemetry

Hunt for data exfiltration through network traffic analysis, detecting unusual data flows, DNS tunneling, cloud storage uploads, and encrypted channel abuse.

Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis, jitter detection, and domain reputation to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure.

Detect Cobalt Strike beacon network activity using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP C2 profile pattern matching, beacon jitter analysis, and named pipe detection via Zeek, Suricata, and Python PCAP analysis.

Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by applying statistical frequency analysis, jitter calculation, and coefficient of variation scoring to detect periodic callbacks from compromised endpoints.

Hunt for malicious PowerShell activity by analyzing Script Block Logging (Event 4104), Module Logging (Event 4103), and process creation events. The analyst parses Windows Event Log EVTX files to detect obfuscated commands, AMSI bypass attempts, encoded payloads, credential dumping keywords, and suspicious download cradles. Activates for requests involving PowerShell threat hunting, script block analysis, encoded command detection, or AMSI bypass identification.

Detects credential stuffing attacks by analyzing authentication logs for login velocity anomalies, ASN diversity, password spray patterns, and geographic distribution of failed logins. Uses statistical analysis on Splunk or raw log data. Use when investigating account takeover campaigns or building detection rules for auth abuse.

Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity within enterprise environments using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts. Use when conducting scheduled threat hunting cycles, investigating anomalous behavior flagged by UEBA, or validating that known APT TTPs are not present in the environment. Activates for requests involving MITRE ATT&CK, Velociraptor, osquery, Zeek, or threat hunting playbooks.

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